Strategic Competition in Digital Platforms for Quality Education: A Review of Game Theoretic Models and Empirical Insights

Abstract

Digital platforms have transformed modern economies by enabling multi-sided interactions, fostering network effects, and orchestrating complex ecosystems. These characteristics distinguish platform markets from traditional industries and raise new questions about strategic competition. This article reviews and synthesizes game-theoretic models and empirical research on platform strategies, focusing on pricing, openness, entry dynamics, and evolutionary competition. The analysis shows that two-sided and multi-sided market theories provide the foundation for creating quality education through developing new body of knowledge to understand asymmetric pricing and classical models such as Bertrand, Cournot, and Hotelling have been adapted to capture platform-specific dynamics. Evolutionary game theory extends the analysis by incorporating adaptive strategies, feedback loops, and multiple equilibria. Empirical studies validate many theoretical predictions but also reveal contextual variations, particularly in user behavior, multi-homing practices, and ecosystem governance. Evidence from Thailand and other emerging economies underscores the importance of regulatory frameworks and consumer perceptions in shaping competition. Policy analysis highlights that governance operates at multiple levels: platforms internally design rules for complementors and users, while regulators externally oversee fairness and market power. The article identifies research gaps in hybrid modeling, behavioral integration, and comparative studies across regions. By linking theory, evidence, and governance debates, this review contributes to advancing scholarly understanding and providing practical insights for policymakers and practitioners to manage digital platform ecosystems for creating sustainable business and communities.